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Summary
The UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan, UNMISS, is one of the 
most ambitious operations in UN history, in terms of local-level peace-
building and the level of decentralization from the capital to its field of-
fices. In the course of the next three years, UNMISS aims to establish a 
presence on the local level through 35 County Support Bases (CSBs) in 
the ten states of South Sudan. According to Hilde Johnson, UN Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and head of UNMISS, 
these will  serve as ‘a platform and a portal for local authorities’,1 as well 
as for humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors, to extend 
state authority and deliver services to the local population.  
The level of ambition reflects the increasing acknowledgement with-
in UN peacekeeping that peace must be built from below, through 
strengthening local institutions and delivering basic services, by includ-
ing the voices of local populations and finding a balance between formal 
and traditional authorities. The question is whether the UN has the stay-
ing power, the bureaucratic flexibility required to operate at such levels, 
the ability to cooperate internally and with other actors and resources 
(human and financial), to follow this ambitious project through, and 
whether expectations will be fulfilled. 
The divide between the centre and the periphery in the (old) Sudan has 
historically been very wide, and local institutional and non-institutional 
actors have barely been connected to the centre, let alone able to in-
fluence national decision-making.2 This pattern is repeated in the new 
state of South Sudan. As the country is barely one year old, there is very 
little space for political opposition, and although some efforts have been 
made to decentralize power to the state level, only 16% of South Sudan’s 
budget reaches the state governments.3 It should also be borne in mind 
that most officials on all levels in the government and administration 
have a history of active participation in the civil war, and very often as 
military officers in the SPLA. The military influence on the administration 
is massive; it will be a great challenge to change the combative and zero-
sum mindset that pervades the current administration of South Sudan, 
towards a more conciliatory and inclusive approach to governance.
This policy brief is based on a recent NUPI report on 
how the UN is undertaking local-level early peace-
building, focusing on the efforts of the UN DPKO Civ-
il Affairs (CA) section in South Sudan.4 The rationale 
for making the connection between Civil Affairs and 
local-level peacebuilding is grounded in the evolving 
understanding that ‘peacekeepers are peacebuilders’5 
and should implement early peacebuilding tasks.6 In 
peacekeeping missions, the Civil Affairs section is 
most frequently deployed throughout the host country, 
providing the UN with a presence on the local level. 
The UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan is 
unique, as the first UN peacekeeping mission with an 
explicit and comprehensive peacebuilding mandate. 
The mandate has been carefully crafted so as not to 
put the main responsibility for peacebuilding on the 
UN. It states that that the UN should ‘develop an early 
strategy in support of national peacebuilding priori-
ties’7 which ‘can deliver prioritized support that re-
flects the specific peacebuilding needs and priorities 
4   Diana Felix da Costa and John Karlsrud (2012). ‘Moving to-
wards local-level peacebuilding?’. Security in Practice 5 • 2012. 
Oslo, NUPI.
5 United Nations 2012. Peace: Keep it. Build it. The Contribution of 
United Nations Peacekeeping to Early Peacebuilding: Strategy. UN 
DPKO and DFS, New York: p. 10.  
6 As defined by the Secretary-General in his opening remarks of 
the Security Council discussion on peacebuilding, 13 October 
2010 (UN 2010), where he stressed that peacekeeping missions 
should be enabled ‘to have an impact as “early peacebuilders”’. 
The meeting in the Security Council was held to discuss the lat-
est Progress Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the 
immediate aftermath of conflict (UN 2010).
7 UNSC (2011) S/RES/1996. Available at: http://www.un.org/ga/
search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1996%282011%29.
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of the Republic of South Sudan.’8 The Civil Affairs sec-
tion is present in all field locations, but in the set-up 
envisaged by the SRSG their responsibility will focus 
on the core tasks of conflict mitigation and political 
space. Reintegration, reconstruction and peacebuild-
ing (RRP) officers will be responsible for enabling the 
CSBs to operate according to the vision of the SRSG.
 
As in many post-conflict countries, also in South Su-
dan the state is nearly entirely absent from rural areas, 
and there is a deep divide between centre and periph-
ery. Until the country’s recent independence, Juba 
was considered ‘periphery’ in relation to Khartoum, 
so it is hardly surprising that there are huge challeng-
es involved in reducing the gap between the current 
political, administrative and economic centre – Juba 
– and the rest of the country. The concept of centre/
periphery is also applicable to state capitals and the 
rest of their territories. The government is present at 
national and state levels, albeit with weak capacity. On 
the county level there is an almost total lack of state 
presence and infrastructure, while below the county 
level (payam and boma) only informal structures exist. 
The principle of decentralization has been more one 
of rhetoric than of action. Most power and resources 
are located in the centre – in Juba, and to a lesser ex-
tent at the state levels.
With some exceptions, most government authorities 
regarded the role of CA and UNMISS more broadly as 
providing logistical support and transport. This type of 
logistical support is critical in a country that is roughly 
the size of France yet has only 100 kilometres of paved 
roads9 – and the rainy season prevents most travel be-
tween state capitals and the rest of the territory. Civil 
Affairs use mission assets (like helicopters and boats) 
as their added-value, and as a tool for their peace facili-
tation and advisory work.
Civil Affairs are playing an important role in facilitat-
ing reconciliation and dialogue in South Sudan. While 
CA officers often remark that they frequently act as 
‘travel agents’ facilitating travel for government offi-
cials at the local, state and national levels, their role 
should not be underestimated, as it enables officials to 
attend peace conferences and engage with local popu-
lations to hear their complaints and concerns. This is 
the first step towards building a relationship between 
the government and its people, with a participatory 
system of governance where the periphery is better 
linked up with the centre in a state. 
UNMISS has a political mandate, and CA has the re-
sponsibility to execute this at the local level. Its work 
focuses primarily on collection and analysis of infor-
mation on localized conflict dynamics, and provid-
ing the government with logistical support ‘in doing 
their job’. CA support focuses on practical aspects of 
conflict resolution, like providing transport to govern-
ment officials and other relevant stakeholders such as 
representatives of Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) 
and local church organizations to peace conferences 
and related events in isolated parts of the country,10 as 
well as assisting in organizing those meetings, partic-
ularly in relation to conflict management. Yet, while 
CA information gathering and analysis skills were 
widely recognized and respected, there were many 
criticisms that these were not shared – sometimes 
not even within the mission, or with other UN agen-
cies, civil society and government. Naturally, some 
analysis should remain internal, but there is a need 
to reflect on the benefits of better information among 
actors operating in the same complex environments. 
Programmes developed by government, UN agencies 
and NGOs would greatly benefit from the information 
analysis done by Civil Affairs.
   
While it is crucial for international actors to work side 
by side with the government, it is equally important 
that CA officers, and all other international actors 
operating on the local level, engage with customary 
authorities as well as emerging community-based or-
ganizations (CBOs), the local churches, youth, women 
and local civil society. In many instances, the influence 
of elders and traditional authorities has been weak-
ened by the civil war. Government-appointed chiefs 
may also not be representative of their communities, 
so all UN officials and other partners must seek to un-
derstand the complex political economy and dynam-
ics on state and local levels, to ensure that more good 
than harm is done. 
Privileging relationships with institutional actors, as 
the UN tends to do, is not an easy task and can com-
plicate or even prevent the organization from engag-
ing with other stakeholders, be they opposition par-
ties or rebel groups. Broad engagement is a necessary 
feature of CA work, and can be crucial to local-level 
development. In South Sudan, the governing party the 
SPLM seeks to maintain the leading position it gained 
through the struggle for independence. In reality there 
is as yet no viable political opposition– which can put 
the UN and CA in a difficult position. This is also re-
flected in challenges to the rule of law, including wide-
spread impunity among SPLA soldiers, in addition 
to the appointment of local administrators recruited 
from the SPLA. It is not uncommon to hear of abuses 
8 Ibid., p. 7.
9 International Monetary Fund 2011. South Sudan Faces Hurdles 
as World’s Newest Country. Available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2011/car071811a.htm accessed 22 
December 2011.
10 For a good study of how the UN can partner with religious actors 
and churches for local peacebuilding, see I.M. Breidlid and A. 
Stensland 2011. ‘The UN Mission and Local Churches in South 
Sudan: Opportunities for Partnerships in Local Peacebuilding’, 
Conflict Trends, 3/2011. Durban,  ACCORD.
3perpetrated by the SPLA themselves, contributing to a 
general sense of lawlessness and impunity. 
Current UN risk-management practices and regula-
tions severely restrict civilian peacekeepers’ ability to 
engage meaningfully with their local government and 
civil society counterparts, as well as with the popula-
tion at large. If UN missions are serious about hav-
ing a role in local peacebuilding, then such practices 
need to be reviewed and become more flexible – for 
instance, through establishing security phases on lo-
cal levels, instead of applying blanket approaches. 
Establishing Country Support Bases across 
South Sudan
The CSBs are part of a very ambitious plan for fur-
ther strengthening the presence of national authori-
ties on the local level. Based on the principle of equal-
ity between international peacekeepers and national 
authorities, each of the CSBs will co-locate local au-
thorities with the UN, sharing the same standards of 
buildings, internet access and facilities. These CSBs 
will also facilitate access for other partners within and 
outside the UN system, including civil society organi-
zations (CSOs). 
The CSBs carry a great promise to the local popula-
tion, a promise that the mission would be wise to 
heed. Unless the presences can be paralleled with 
service delivery and can result in real peace dividends 
for local populations, the result may be anger and loss 
of confidence in peacekeepers and local authorities 
alike. The CSBs will thus be a prism through which to 
follow and measure how well the international com-
munity and the government in Juba are managing to 
instil the trust and confidence needed to achieve ‘real’ 
peacebuilding from the ground up in South Sudan. 
While all actors should have a sober vision about what 
the UN can realistically be expected to achieve with 
only a few CSBs in a country the size of France, the 
CSBs will clearly be an initiative that merits continued 
and careful scrutiny by the international and research 
communities alike. 
Recommendations
1.	 UN	Civil	affairs	and	local-level	engagement
a. Consider embedding/co-locating CA officers in 
relevant state-level government offices, in coordi-
na tion with the UN Development Programme 
(UNDP) and AECOM;11  
b. Continue to support an inclusive dialogue with the 
political opposition;
c. Encourage local government authorities to work 
with customary authorities, including inviting 
them to meetings, ceremonies and other events;
d. Make use of local CBOs and CSOs to reach out to 
the population and the village level.
2.	 How	to	help	local	actors	to	influence	national	deci-
sion-making	processes?
a. Press for a more participatory approach in national 
decision-making organs and politicians, through 
the SRSG on the strategic level and CA officers on 
the operational and tactical levels;
b. Ensure that the CSBs contribute to feeding local 
voices into national policy processes, including 
youth, civil society and customary authorities;
c. Continue and expand the cooperation between the 
UNDP and CA on the Community Security and 
Arms Control12 consultations, and use the presence 
of the CSBs to expand these to the county level as 
well.  
3.	 The	UN	 and	 local	 peacebuilding	 –	moving	 from	
civil	affairs	to	County	Support	Bases	(CSBs)
a. Share the baseline study undertaken in the payams 
with civil society and other development actors to 
get their inputs and to enable programming for 
local-level peacebuilding and development;
b. Ensure close cooperation in CSBs and on state and 
national levels between CA and the RRP section/
UN country team; 
c. The CSBs should be externally evaluated after the 
first year of operation to improve value for money, 
effectiveness and ownership among local stake-
holders, and to remedy possible unintended conse-
quences; 
d. Review the implications of the transfer of quick im-
pact projects (QIPs) from CA to the RRP officers af-
ter one year, in terms of effectiveness, comparative 
advantages and possible unintended consequenc-
es.
4.	 Promoting	local	ownership	–	the	recurring	
	 challenge
a. Continuously consider and reflect on questions of 
legitimacy of local actors
b. Involve the youth, as well as other groups such 
as elders and women, in peace conferences and 
events, as well throughout the entire long-term 
follow-up process
c. Continue the decentralized mission agenda that 
empowers local CA teams to operate contextually 
and flexibly, including developing policy lines for 
how state coordinators should approach their local 
substantive teams
d. Sensitize UNDSS and other administrative sec-
tions such as MOVCON to the flexible nature of 
peacebuilding/CA work.
11 AECOM, a US private company financed by USAID, has been 
engaged in peace work in South Sudan since 2007.  For more see 
http://www.aecom.com/Where+We+Are/Africa/_projectsList/
Sudan+Transition+Initiative.
12 See UNDP 2011. ‘Community Security and Arms Control 
in Southern Sudan’. Available at http://www.sd.undp.org/
projects/s_cp2.htm.
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5.	 How	can	the	UN	strengthen	the	confidence	of	local	
populations	in	central	authorities?
a. Allocate all state coordinator positions to individu-
als with a CA background: that means persons 
with backgrounds from the country or at least the 
region, as well as experience in conflict manage-
ment, analysis and local peacebuilding 
b. Promote greater information-sharing of CA con-
flict analyses and reports within and beyond the 
mission, including to the government and the 
UNDP, while acknowledging that some informa-
tion may be too politically sensitive to share with 
the government.
About the project
The project of which this policy brief is a part exam-
ines how Civil Affairs in several missions operation-
alize and implement their mandates, through field 
research in Haiti, Liberia and South Sudan. It also 
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and development actors. When initiating this study, 
the research team chose the Civil Affairs (CA) section 
of UN peacekeeping operations as an entry point, as 
this section is usually deployed wherever the peace-
keeping mission has established presences, and is 
tasked with, inter alia, acting as the intermediary with 
local authorities and populations, as well as the rest of 
the UN peacekeeping mission and other UN actors. 
The present report is the result of one month of field-
work in Juba, Eastern Equatoria State and Upper Nile 
State in October and November 2011. It forms part of 
the project Contextualizing peacebuilding activities to 
local circumstances, which is supported by the Norwe-
gian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
